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NOTE† 
THEIR BROTHERS’ KEEPERS:  
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE 




What procedure must a legal system establish to be considered legitimate by 
the parties before it? How much information must a court collect, and in what 
way, before rendering a decision? When rendering a decision, to what extent 
must the court explain its reasoning and the facts that impacted its decision? 
Scholars, politicians, and the courts themselves have long debated these 
questions of procedural justice.1 Historically, this debate was largely normative 
and theoretical.2 But in the 1970s, psychologists began to empirically study 
whether individuals perceived court decisions as legitimate and whether certain 
procedures might impact that perceived legitimacy.3 
Procedural Justice Theory has grown out of this empirical research. It argues 
that the level of procedure—comprised of the various procedural safeguards and 
participation rights—provided in litigation impacts how parties perceive the 
fairness of a court’s decision.4 This perception consequently impacts how likely 
parties are to follow the court’s decision and the law more generally.5 
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1.  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 127, 138–40 (2011). 
2.  Id. at 140 (“The philosophical and legal theory perspectives . . . rely on philosophical
conceptions about the nature of procedural justice . . . .”). 
3.  See id. at 132–38 (discussing the empirical research developments on these issues since the
1970s). 
4.  See generally Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117
(2000) (explaining that criteria of procedural justice, like participation, neutrality and trustworthiness of 
decision-makers, and dignity and respect, influence whether a party views the procedures and outcomes 
as fair).  
5.  See id. at 119 (discussing research, for example, on how people who believe fair procedures
leading to a particular outcome are more likely to follow those outcomes over time). 
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This field has primarily focused on studying and critiquing trial-level 
litigation.6 But recent work has begun to explore how Procedural Justice Theory 
might apply to the intermediate appellate courts (IAC),7 and initial results 
support the notion that procedural justice principles apply on appeal.8 
This Note considers the role of the IACs to propose a new theoretical 
framework for applying Procedural Justice Theory to appellate procedure. The 
unique position of the IACs within our broader legal system likely impacts how 
their decisions and procedures affect parties. Parties may well bring their 
perceptions of the trial court’s procedure to the appellate courts tasked with 
reviewing the conclusions of the court below. If an IAC ignores a trial court’s 
procedural failings—or, worse, reinforces them through its own failing—then it 
risks compounding a party’s perception that the court system is illegitimate. 
Applying this framework, this Note identifies two distinct categories of 
procedural justice concerns that potentially arise in appellate litigation: discrete 
concerns that arise on appeal in much the same way as at trial, and aggregate 
concerns that incorporate potential procedural failings below.9 These concerns 
might apply differently in various appeals and may cause parties bringing facially 
similar appeals to perceive certain procedure in vastly different ways. Further, 
these categories likely suggest the need for different types of reforms by the 
IACs. Thus, both researchers and the courts may benefit from considering how 
both discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns might impact the parties 
on appeal. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II provides more background on 
procedural justice, both generally and in the IACs. Part III outlines the debate 
over error correction in the IACs and, drawing on the error correction debate, 
posits that the IACs’ position in the American legal system gives rise to both 
discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns. This Part further describes 
how the two categories might differ in both application and remedy. Part IV 
discusses asylum appeals in the Second Circuit to provide a real-world example 
of aggregate procedural justice in action. Part V concludes. 
II 
THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE DEBATE IN U.S. COURTS 
Although decisions by the IACs have public value because of their 
precedential effect on future litigation,10 they may only be issued on an actual 
 
 6.  See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference:” Examining Unpublished Decisions in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533, 565 (2020) (“There has been little work exploring the 
experience of procedural justice in the specific context of appellate litigation.”). 
 7.  See, e.g., id. (providing an overview of unpublished opinions at the federal appellate level and 
discussing how unpublished opinions relate to procedural justice values). 
 8.  Id. at 566 (citing Scott Barclay, A New Aspect of Lawyer-Client Interactions: Lawyers Teaching 
Process-Focused Clients to Think About Outcomes, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 1 (2004)). 
 9.  See infra Part III. 
 10.  See McAlister, supra note 6, at 561 (discussing how unpublished opinions, despite having only 
persuasive rather than precedential value, retain public value). 
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dispute between two parties and have the greatest impact on the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties to the appeal.11 Recognizing this effect on the 
parties, scholars have begun to critique appellate procedure through the lens of 
Procedural Justice Theory. This Part discusses the procedural justice debate, both 
generally and in the IACs. 
A.  Procedural Justice: The Philosophical and Empirical Debate 
Philosophers and legal scholars have long debated the question of what 
constitutes “due” or “fair” process in adjudication.12 Participants in this debate 
have largely fallen into two camps: one camp focused on the outcome of the 
adjudication and the so-called dignitary camp focused on the process itself.13 
The outcome camp argues that any legal system should, as its central goal, 
seek to maximize “substantively accurate outcomes.”14 From this central goal, 
courts should establish a procedure for adjudication that most likely leads to 
correct decisions.15 Some procedures—including the opportunity for parties to 
brief the issues and arguments—help the adjudicator arrive at a correct result, 
while others—such as the ability to physically stand before the judge for 
argument—may not further that goal in every case. Thus, according to the 
outcome focused camp, courts should add or remove procedure to efficiently 
minimize the chance of substantive error.16 
Conversely, the dignitary camp argues that procedure has intrinsic value 
independent from the ultimate decision. For example, Lawrence Tribe describes 
a party’s procedural right to be heard as “analytically distinct from the right to 
secure a different outcome.”17 According to the dignitary camp, the societal 
benefits flowing from participation in the adjudication of one’s legal rights are 
themselves fundamental to a legal system. Thus, on this theory, courts should 
establish a level of procedure that maximizes those benefits.18 
Historically, this debate was largely theoretical and conceptual, focusing on 
the theoretical demands and the potential impact of specific procedures on 
 
 11.  The impact on the parties is most direct in the case of unpublished opinions, which have only 
limited precedential value and constitute the majority of decisions rendered by the IACs. See id. at 561, 
551 fig.2 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.B-
12 (2018)). 
 12.  See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 130 (discussing the varied debate over the term as used 
within and between fields). 
 13.  Id. at 138. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 138–39. 
 17.  Id. at 139 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 667 (2d ed. 
1988)). 
 18.  See id. (“As Tribe explained, ‘At stake here is not just the much-acclaimed appearance of justice 
but, from a perspective that treats process as intrinsically significant, the very essence of justice.’”). 
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hypothetical litigation.19 In the mid-1970s, however, psychologists brought a 
subjective and empirical lens to the debate. Specifically, researchers began 
studying why people followed the law, focusing on whether certain procedures in 
an adjudication improved the likelihood that individuals would accept the results 
of a negative decision.20 
The results of these studies suggest that the procedure afforded to parties 
impacts the likelihood that they will accept and adhere to an adverse decision.21 
When faced with a negative outcome, parties who feel that they were treated 
fairly during the dispute are more likely to view the decisionmaker as legitimate.22 
This legitimacy leads to greater respect for the negative decision and a greater 
likelihood that the parties will follow it.23 Conversely, parties who feel that an 
authority treated them unfairly are more likely to view the authority as less 
legitimate. Consequently, those parties are less likely to obey both the specific 
decision and other laws imposed by that authority.24 The research further 
suggests that, while litigants care most about the outcomes of litigation, they also 
independently care about how they perceive the system’s fairness.25 
This perception—the fairness of the authority—can be impacted by different 
procedures implemented in the adjudication.26 Specifically, Tom R. Tyler has 
identified four principles of procedural justice that contribute to a party’s 
perception of the fairness of an adjudication: (1) the extent to which the party 
believes she had an opportunity to be heard, (2) the neutrality of the forum, (3) 
the trustworthiness of the decisionmaker, and (4) the degree of dignity and 
respect afforded to the party.27 These operate in tandem, and certain procedural 
rules may impact multiple considerations.28 
First, parties place significant weight on “the opportunity to express their 
views to decision-makers.”29 Specifically, parties value participation even when 
they know that it “will not meaningfully affect the decision.”30 Thus, courts can 
 
 19.  See id. at 149 (describing legal procedural due process as “explicitly normative” and “rely[ing] 
on philosophical conceptions about the nature of procedural justice rather than on any empirical 
research”). 
 20.  See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975). 
 21.  See, e.g., McAlister, supra note 6 at 566 & nn.175–76 (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY 
THE LAW 107–08 (1990)). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See id. at 563 (“That is not to say that outcomes are irrelevant to litigants, but it is to say that the 
treatment litigants receive matters independently.” (citing Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 137)). 
 26.  See Tyler, supra note 5, at 121 (“[A]uthorities that use fair decision-making procedures are 
viewed as more legitimate, and people more willingly defer to their decisions.”). 
 27.  Id. at 121–23. 
 28.  See McAlister, supra note 6, at 564–65 (discussing how reasoned explanations improve a party’s 
belief in the trustworthiness and neutrality of the tribunal, as well as the dignity and respect shown to the 
party). 
 29.  Tyler, supra note 5, at 121.  
 30.  Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 136. 
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support procedural justice (and improve their own legitimacy) by providing the 
opportunity for argument even when it will not affect the outcome of litigation. 
This consideration may be further enhanced by the way decisionmakers present 
their decisions. For example, Tyler suggests that litigants are more likely to 
accept a decision when the judge tells them that “[their] views were considered 
but (unfortunately) could not influence the decision . . . .”31 
Similarly, the neutrality of the forum and trustworthiness of the 
decisionmaker are two related but distinct factors impacting a party’s assessment 
of the “quality of decision making” and consequently the fairness of the process.32 
Parties view the forum as neutral if decisionmakers are impartial and objective, 
and do not allow personal bias to impact their decisions.33 Decisionmakers are 
trustworthy when they show that they care about the parties and try to make a 
fair decision.34 
Finally, parties respect decisions reached by adjudicators who treat them with 
dignity and respect throughout the process. Dignity and respect can be shown by 
listening to the parties, taking their arguments seriously, and providing a rational 
decision that explains what motivated each conclusion.35 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff further theorizes that the identity of the parties 
may impact their experiences and ultimate conclusions regarding the fairness of 
adjudication.36 For example, natural persons—especially the most vulnerable 
members of society—may experience all procedural justice failures more acutely 
than corporations or other “repeat players.”37 
Critical race theory scholars condemn this focus on procedure, arguing that it 
obscures the law’s substantive impact on systemic inequality and racism and 
undermines substantive change.38 Their claims are valid: No amount of 
procedural window dressing can fix substantive law that harms people. But 
procedural justice exists outside substantive law; it can undermine just laws and 
compound the negative effects of harmful ones. For this reason, it is worth 
 
 31.  See McAlister, supra note 6, at 564 (quoting TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 149 
(1990)).  
 32.  Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 
283, 298 (2003); see also Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 136 (“Neutrality and trust are distinct but 
related factors.”). 
 33.  Tyler, supra note 5, at 122. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  McAlister, supra note 6, at 564–65. 
 36.  See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 147–49 (describing how procedural justice compares 
between corporate entities and individuals). 
 37.  Id.; see also McAlister, supra note 6, at 566–67 (“Natural persons, as opposed to the corporate 
appellants who dominate the first tier, may be more affected by these experiences. And society’s most 
vulnerable members—including the poor and the prisoners who often proceed pro se on appeal—may 
experience procedural justice failures more acutely, as they injure self-esteem and threaten group 
inclusion.”). 
 38.  For example, Monica C. Bell argues that a focus on procedural justice implies that the problem 
of policing is rooted at some level in African Americans’ refusal to follow the law, rather than “race- and 
class-subjugation.” Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE 
L.J. 2054, 2061 (2017). 
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considering how procedure and procedural justice interact with substantive law.39 
B.  Appellate Procedural Justice 
Much of the procedural justice debate has focused on adjudications of first 
instance—that is, trial litigation.40 In the last thirty years, however, scholars have 
begun expanding the debate to consider the procedure given to parties on 
appeal.41 
The relative recency of this debate is largely explained by the historical 
procedure afforded by the Circuit Courts. Prior to the 1970s nearly every federal 
appeal received the “Learned Hand Model” of appellate procedure, the 
sufficiency of which was never in doubt.42 Under this model, every party to the 
appeal had the opportunity to brief their argument.43 A three-judge panel heard 
oral argument, followed by a panel conference where the judges met to discuss 
their decisions.44 One judge prepared a draft opinion, which was reviewed by the 
rest of the panel.45 The authoring judge incorporated any notes before issuing a 
final opinion, which stated the facts and issue, the relevant law, the court’s 
analysis, and the holding.46 Finally, the remaining judges could dissent or concur 
to present their own decision on the issue. 
The time and effort demanded by this lengthy review, and a growing federal 
docket crisis, put increasing strain on the Circuit Courts throughout the second 
half of the 20th Century.47 In response to this crisis, the Circuit Courts 
implemented “modern case management”—relaxing the level of procedure 
afforded to certain cases in pursuit of judicial efficiency.48 The number of cases 
receiving oral argument decreased, and the rate of summary disposition through 
unpublished opinions—shorter, party-oriented opinions often without a formal 
author—increased.49 Judges also began relying more heavily on clerks to screen 
cases and in some instances draft opinions.50 
 
 39.  In this note, I do not propose enhanced procedure as a panacea. Rather, I hope to suggest that 
a lack of procedure may obscure substantive harms and compound their impact on affected parties. 
 40.  See McAlister, supra note 6, at 565 & n.167 (“There has been little work exploring the experience 
of procedural justice in the specific context of appellate litigation.”).  
 41.  See id. at 565–66 (citing Scott Barclay, A New Aspect of Lawyer-Client Interactions: Lawyers 
Teaching Process-Focused Clients to Think About Outcomes, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2004)).  
 42.  Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the 
Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 374 (2011); see also, William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, 
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 273, 278 (1996). 
 43.  Richman & Reynolds, supra note 42, at 278. 
 44.  The Evarts Act of 1891, which established the modern structure of the United States Courts of 
Appeals, originally allotted three circuit judges to each circuit, all of whom heard every appeal. See 
Judiciary (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).  
 45.  Richman & Reynolds, supra note 42, at 278. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Levy, supra note 42, at 321. 
 48.  Id. at 321–22. 
 49.  Id. at 322–23. 
 50.  Id. at 323. 
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In response to this modern case management, the procedural justice debate 
turned to appellate procedure. In the 1990s, William Richman and William 
Reynolds authored Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari,51 highlighting 
and criticizing the relaxations of the Learned Hand Model.52 These “shortcuts to 
decision making,” they argue, lead to lower quality decisions that increase error 
rates and leave the law underdeveloped.53 
More importantly, they identify a trend in these shortcuts: the Circuit Courts 
focus all the procedural shortcuts onto specific categories of cases, functionally 
creating two tiers of appellate procedure.54 Tier-one cases—those continuing to 
receive the Learned Hand Model—involve wealthy and connected parties or 
disputed issues of law.55 Tier-two cases—the targets of every single procedure 
limiting change—involve claims of error arising from prisoners, pro se litigants, 
and other marginalized members of the community.56 The collective effect of all 
these shortcuts, they argue, is to turn the IACs into functional certiorari courts 
for the most vulnerable members of society. This change threatens “the basic 
guarantee of justice to all in equal measure” and undermines the “perceived 
legitimacy” of the IACs.57 Following this seminal work, other scholars have used 
procedural justice theory to analyze appellate procedure.58 
While scholars have expanded the theoretical debate to appellate procedure, 
empirical procedural justice theory has largely remained rooted in trial litigation. 
Indeed, Tyler’s research and subsequent replication studied adjudications of first 
instance.59 In recent history, however, some limited empirical studies on appellate 
litigation have supported the notion that the four elements of procedural justice 
identified by Tyler’s findings also apply on appeal. In one notable study of 
appellate procedural justice, Scott Barclay interviewed 125 civil litigants and 
found that they often considered goals other than outcome when deciding to 
appeal their case.60 Most notably, litigants may take an appeal “in order to have 
[their] story taken seriously” by the IAC even when the odds of success are very 
low.61 These recent theoretical and empirical expansions suggest that procedural 
justice research in the IACs is a burgeoning field that will likely see increased 
study in the near future. 
 
 51.  Richman & Reynolds, supra note 42. 
 52.  Id. at 278. 
 53.  Id. at 294–95. 
 54.  Id. at 293–94. 
 55.  Id. at 296. 
 56.  Id. at 295–96. 
 57.  Id. at 297. 
 58.  See generally, McAlister, supra note 6 (theorizing that the elements of procedural justice might 
apply in the appellate courts much as they do at trial). 
 59.  Id. at 565. 
 60.  Scott Barclay, A New Aspect of Lawyer-Client Interactions: Lawyers Teaching Process-Focused 
Clients to Think About Outcomes, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 5 (2004). 
 61.  Id. at 8. 
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III 
DISCRETE AND AGGREGATE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE IACS 
As the empirical analysis of procedural justice in the IACs grows more robust, 
it will be helpful to consider how the position of the IACs within the broader 
legal system may impact how parties experience appellate procedure. 
Specifically, the decision and procedure afforded to the parties below likely 
impacts how they experience the procedure on appeal. This impact leads to two 
distinct conceptualizations of procedural justice in the IACs: a discrete 
conceptualization that requires a certain level of procedure to adjudicate the 
appeal, and an aggregate conceptualization that tasks the IACs with addressing 
potential procedural deficiencies experienced in the trial below. 
To explicate this dichotomy more fully, it is helpful to first consider a different 
debate in the IACs: the debate over the proper conception of error correction in 
the Circuit Courts. 
A.  The Error Correction Debate in the IACs 
Most contemporary discussions identify two primary functions of the United 
States Circuit Courts: error correction and law development.62 The error 
correction role—reviewing the trial below to “ensure that an appropriate and just 
outcome has been reached”63—is often considered the core historical justification 
for the appeal as of right.64 Indeed, because “[e]very appeal necessarily involves 
at least one claim that the trial court erred,” the Circuit Courts’ law development 
function—deciding how an open question of law should apply to the facts—
formally operates as a collateral consequence of error correction.65 The overlap 
between these roles has led some to conceptualize the dichotomy as merely a 
difference in the difficulty of the question before the IACs: error correction 
applies to “easy cases” where settled law clearly controls the issue, and law 
development applies to “hard questions” where the IAC must fill gaps in the 
law.66 
Even after removing hard questions from consideration, “[t]here are 
countless possible variations of error.”67 The Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure direct the Circuit Courts to identify errors below and set aside verdicts 
for “harmful error,” but never define “error.”68 Under this doctrinal ambiguity, 
individual circuit judges must craft personal conceptualizations of error and, by 
 
 62.  See, e.g., Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 712 (2000). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REV. 
411, 412–14 (1987) (describing the historical approach to appeals in the United States, where district court 
judges and supreme court justices would form temporary panels to review decisions for error). 
 65.  Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 64 (2010).  
 66.  See, e.g., id. at 65. 
 67.  Id. at 56 (quoting ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 16 (1970)). 
 68.  Id. at 55–56. 
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extension, the court’s error correction role. Chad Oldfather surveyed the Circuit 
Courts, and identifies two broad conceptualizations of error correction, which he 
argues are rooted in prevailing legal theories.69 
First, he identifies a case-based conceptualization of error that finds support 
in legal realism.70 Under this approach, the court primarily asks whether the 
“right” party prevailed below.71 This approach, he argues, collapses into a 
“relatively broad and unconstrained focus on the justness of the trial court’s 
overall resolution.”72 Though the parties may identify actual conduct below that 
constitutes legal error, that conduct takes a back seat to the ultimate disposition. 
Following this lodestar, courts may ignore “technicalities” if they conclude that 
the correct party prevailed below, or they may conversely reverse the decision 
below “regardless of what the parties had put before it” where it seems the wrong 
party prevailed.73 
Second, Oldfather argues for reconceptualizing the error correction role 
through the lens of legal process theory. In this conceptualization, he casts the 
appeal as a derivative dispute—a discrete claim that the other party was unjustly 
enriched by an erroneous judgment.74 This conceptualization prioritizes the 
specific issue raised, rather than the ultimate disposition of the case below.75 A 
court approaching error correction in this way considers first and foremost 
whether the party’s discrete appeal—that is, the claim of error—has legal merit, 
regardless of who prevailed below.76 This approach, he argues, better emphasizes 
the parties, and maintains the legitimacy of the appeals process.77 
This debate reveals a broader dichotomy in how the IACs and litigants might 
conceptualize the role of the IACs within the legal system. On the aggregate, or 
case-based conceptualization, the IACs exist as one link in the chain that is a 
multi-tiered legal system constructed to resolve a core dispute. The appeals they 
hear are intrinsically connected to the ultimate dispute, and parties experience 
the appeal with an eye towards their entire case. 
On the discrete, or issue-based conceptualization, the IACs exist as 
independent adjudicatory bodies resolving a specific issue that may incidentally 
impact some other dispute. The appeals they hear are self-contained disputes and 
parties might experience the appeal much like they would a subsequent trial 
against someone they have sued in the past. 
 
 69.  Id. at 77, 81. 
 70.  Id. at 68–69. 
 71.  Id. at 59–60. 
 72.  Id. at 52. 
 73.  Id. at 59. 
 74.  Id. at 81. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 81–82. 
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B.  Discrete and Aggregate Procedural Justice Concerns 
These two theories of error correction map relatively cleanly onto the 
discussion of procedural justice in the IACs. Applying this dichotomy reveals the 
two distinct categories of procedural justice concerns that may arise in appellate 
procedure: discrete concerns and aggregate concerns. 
1.  Discrete Procedural Justice Concerns 
Reflecting the issue-based conceptualization of the IACs, all appeals likely 
raise procedural justice concerns as a new, discrete adjudication. When a party 
appeals, the IAC becomes the court of first instance as it relates to the claim of 
error. Oriented in this way, the four procedural justice considerations identified 
by Tyler and others apply against an IAC in much the same way they would 
against another trial court in a different litigation.78 
In this light, appellate procedure matters to the parties independently when 
the appeal commences. If appellants feel that they do not have the opportunity 
to be heard on appeal, or that the IAC has not seriously considered their 
arguments or sufficiently explained its reasoning in ruling against them, then they 
may lose trust in the ability of the IACs to legitimately review cases.79 
Further, because the appellate loser cares about the procedure on appeal 
whether a loss is affirmed or win reversed, discrete procedural justice likely 
applies categorically. This further reflects (at least theoretical) 
conceptualizations of procedural justice in the trial courts.80 Because every party 
to an appeal might lose the appeal, discrete procedural justice “can always be 
discussed with respect to all parties.”81 
2.  Aggregate Procedural Justice Concerns 
Aggregate procedural justice reflects a case-based approach that recognizes 
the role of the IACs within the broader justice system. Every stage of litigation is 
one in a series of connected interactions between parties and authority that 
inform a party’s perception of the system’s fairness. At every link in this chain, 
procedural deficiencies can undermine the party’s faith in that system. Parties do 
not forget procedural failings when they proceed to the appeal. In fact, these 
failings are often the reason for the appeal.82 Allowing such failings to continue 
through the appellate system without redress reinforces and often compounds 
 
 78.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 79.  These legitimacy concerns may manifest in ways showing dissatisfaction with the IACs, but not 
the entire system. For example, the filing of more petitions for certiorari at the Supreme Court, litigation 
campaigns to change the law through repeated appeals, or attempts to narrow precedent from below or 
calls to change the structure and balance of the IACs. 
 80.  See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 144. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See generally Barclay, supra note 60; Oldfather, supra note 65. 
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their negative effects.83 
If an “unfair” proceeding undermines the legitimacy of the authority making 
that decision, those effects are magnified when the party calls attention to that 
unfairness. This initial unfairness is compounded when a second authority, tasked 
with identifying and remedying unfairness below, blesses the failing as perfectly 
acceptable within the system. When IACs affirm and reinforce procedural 
deficiencies, the deficiency infects the appeal and undermines the legitimacy of 
the entire system. This degradation of faith in the system is multiplied when the 
process for review raises the exact same procedural justice concerns as the action 
being reviewed. When parties appeal their case to address a lack of voice or 
dignity in the process but receive only a summary affirmance without the 
opportunity to tell their story, they may hear that their exclusion from the system 
is a feature, not a bug. 
These concerns are especially weighty for the last authority to review the case. 
The body with whom the buck stops is both the last line of defense to rectify any 
mistakes, and the source for any actual or perceived tone at the top. An actual or 
de facto court of last resort that summarily affirms deficient procedure sends a 
clear message to both the lower bodies and the parties. 
Thus, aggregate procedural justice concerns incorporate the entire 
adjudicatory system, asking all bodies tasked with review—but especially the 
final review—to consider the procedure experienced below. If the body identifies 
any procedural justice issues below, it should alter its procedure to remedy that 
deficiency. 
Aggregate procedural justice concerns are theoretically boundless; an 
appellate body would need to respond to any of a near infinite number of ways 
in which the lower body may have failed the parties. The United States has 
limited the potential concerns, however, by incorporating lower procedure into 
substantive review.84 Because litigants still care most about outcomes, an 
authority likely need not account for past process deficiencies where the affected 
party wins on appeal, especially when the party wins because of the deficiency.85 
In light of this substantive review, aggregate procedural justice concerns 
likely only arise when the lower procedure undermines a party’s faith in the 
system without offending substantive law—that is, when the IAC will affirm the 
lower court despite the problematic procedure. In these cases, the reviewing body 
should take care to ensure that the parties have a voice and that the body fully 
 
 83.  McAlister has also made a similar suggestion—in passing—about the aggregate effects of 
procedural justice concerns. See McAlister, supra note 6, at 566 (“[T]he appellants expectations as to 
reason-giving may vary depending on the extent of process received at the trial level.”). 
 84.  See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 140–46 (discussing the similarities and differences of 
procedural justice and procedural due process). 
 85.  Consider, for example, Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), where the Supreme Court issued 
a three paragraph per curiam opinion without oral argument. Given the procedural deficiencies below, 
such a summary disposition would arguably have raised aggregate procedural justice concerns, except 
that the Court held that the procedure below violated the Due Process Clause and reversed the decision. 
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explains why it must affirm the lower decision.86 
Finally, because aggregate procedural justice concerns arise when the 
reviewing court affirms deficient procedure below, the process arguably deviates 
from the traditional conceptualization of procedural justice as always applying to 
every party.87 Rather, aggregate concerns may arise unilaterally, only impacting 
the appellant—that is, the trial court loser. For this reason, aggregate procedural 
justice concerns may (depending on the appellant’s identity) arise differently in 
appeals that, at first blush, appear very similar. Aggregate procedure may thus 
cause ostensibly similar parties to experience an IAC’s procedure in vastly 
different ways. Considering how aggregate procedural justice may impact these 
parties might help researchers craft their studies and analyze results to ensure the 
most accurate view of appellate procedure’s effects on litigants. 
C.  Comparing the Demands of Discrete and Aggregate Procedural Justice 
Having described discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns, it may 
be helpful to further theorize when the categories might arise and what might be 
required to remedy them. At the threshold, aggregate and procedural justice 
concerns likely arise to different degrees depending on the specific facts of the 
appeal and the parties. As discussed, discrete concerns apply categorically and 
likely arise in much the same way that they do in the trial court. Conversely, 
aggregate issues arise most acutely when: (1) the IAC is likely to affirm the lower 
court, and (2) the lower court’s procedure was problematic, but nonetheless 
permissible. 
Though discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns may arise to 
different degrees in different appeals, they need not impose different demands 
on the IACs. Because discrete procedural justice conceives of the appeal as 
essentially a new trial, the demands are likely similar to those of a new trial. 
Relatedly, any aggregate procedural justice concerns may well be remedied by a 
new trial with sufficient process. In its purest form then, de novo review of the 
trial or relevant issue arguably cures all aggregate concerns provided the 
procedure on review is discretely sufficient. 
To be sure, IACs lack the judicial resources to provide de novo review of 
every appeal. But even where the IAC does not completely replicate the initial 
review, discrete procedural justice concerns—combined with substantive 
considerations of procedure—may still respond to potential aggregate concerns. 
This phenomenon can be seen in the historical Learned Hand model of appellate 
review. The participation, trustworthiness, and dignity of a complete opinion 
following full oral argument likely remedied much of the harm from deficient 
 
 86.  Because the outcome of the case cannot be definitively known at the time procedure is set, 
appellate bodies should focus on those cases or types of cases with a high potential for an affirmance that 
would further undermine a party’s faith in the system. This still will likely be less than all of a certain type 
of appeal. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 87.  Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 145. 
06_MOLASKEY  (DO NOT DELETE) 9/15/2021  1:00 PM 
No. 3 2021] THEIR BROTHERS’ KEEPERS 93 
procedure below, especially where the appeal resulted in reversal.88 
Thus, aggregate and discrete procedural justice demands only diverge when 
(1) the IAC reviews an appeal under deferential standards, shifting the derivative 
suit away from a de facto new trial; (2) the IAC finds problematic procedure 
below nonetheless substantively permissible; and (3) the procedure required to 
satisfy discrete concerns is insufficient to also satisfy aggregate concerns. In other 
words, tier-two cases. 
From the first instances of relaxing appellate process, decisions on procedure 
were explicitly predicated on the complexity of the case and the marginal 
improvement in decisional accuracy.89 Under the two-tier regime, tier one 
cases—often brought by corporate parties or repeat players—receive the 
Learned Hand treatment because they raise complex issues with difficult 
answers.90 Meanwhile, tier-two procedure is predicated on the theory that a 
decision is easy and that increased participation would not aid deliberation.91 
Consideration of the procedure afforded to the parties below, or of the intrinsic 
benefits flowing from appellate procedure, are absent from this system. 
Many of these changes were made in pursuit of judicial efficiency, which 
remains a central concern for the federal courts. But his Note’s critique has a 
silver lining: When aggregate and discrete concerns diverge in a given case, the 
procedures required to remedy them also diverge. Specifically, because aggregate 
procedural justice issues only arise based on the specific procedure below, 
remedies can be much more focused. Only those cases where an appealing party 
received deficient procedure below need require increased procedures. Thus, 
rather than apply new procedure to entire classes of cases, the IAC can likely 
remedy aggregate concerns with flexible approaches that seek to identify and 
remedy individual cases. 
IV 
AGGREGATE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN ACTION: THE SURGE IN ASYLUM 
CASES 
The case of United States asylum appeals in the early twenty-first century 
provides a helpful real-world example of how aggregate procedural justice 
 
 88.  Indeed, Richman and Reynolds suggest that the Learned Hand Model upheld the “guarantee 
of justice to all in equal measure.” Richman & Reynolds, supra note 42, at 297. 
 89.  See, e.g., id. at 296 (The standard explanation for the existence of different tracks of justice is 
that some cases are more ‘important’ than others.”); Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) (requiring oral argument 
unless, inter alia, “the dispositive issue . . . [has] been authoritatively decided” or “the decisional process 
would not be significantly aided by oral argument”). 
 90.  See Levy, supra note 42, at 334 (noting that circuit screening bodies recommend oral argument 
based on “several factors, including the novelty of the issues . . . , the number of issues raised, the number 
of parties, . . . the size of the record, . . . [and] . . . whether the appellant is represented by counsel.”). 
 91.  See Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit’s Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases: A Case 
Study of a Judicial Response to an Unprecedented Problem of Caseload Management, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 
429, 436 (2008) (defending a lack of oral argument in asylum appeals because the benefits “would not 
have been significant” and because internal screeners “invariably provide more insightful and 
comprehensive analysis”). 
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concerns may deviate from discrete justice concerns, how the current two-tier 
system of appellate process potentially ignores such aggregate concerns, and how 
the IACs could address these aggregate concerns without being crushed under 
an exploding docket. 
A.  Factual Background: Asylum Review 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and subsequent amendments 
control modern U.S. immigration policy.92 These laws govern the process by 
which foreign nationals apply for asylum in the United States.93 The Departments 
of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) share joint responsibility for 
implementing the INA, including the asylum process.94 The DOJ and DHS have 
promulgated joint regulations defining the procedure for reviewing requests for 
asylum and refugee status, as well as the system for appealing such decisions.95 
1.  The Asylum Application Process 
The administrative framework requires individuals first apply for asylum and 
have their case adjudicated by either (or both) an Asylum Officer in the United 
States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) or an Immigration Judge (IJ). 
An IJ is an Administrative Law Judge in the DOJ’s Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (Immigration Court).96 Both the Asylum Officer and IJ 
constitute legal adjudicators, but the IJ’s role is quasi-judicial, and proceedings 
before the IJ resemble litigation.97 
In all cases, the asylum applicant has the burden of proving that she is eligible 
for asylum as a refugee under the statutory definition before any decision to stay 
deportation can be made.98 The exact process changes, however, depending on 
whether the application is: (1) an affirmative application, (2) a defensive 
application, or (3) a credible fear application.99 
An affirmative application occurs when an individual in the United States, 
 
 92.  Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); see Erika Lee, 
Immigrants and Immigration Law: A State of the Field Assessment, J. AM. ETHNIC HIST., Summer 1999, 
at 85, 94. Immigration laws are collected in Title 8 of the United States Code. 
 93.  8 U.S.C. § 1103. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  8 C.F.R. 
 96.  See infra notes 107–116 and accompanying text. 
 97.  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Org. & Functions Manual §17(D). 
 98.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). The applicant’s testimony alone may satisfy this burden, provided it is 
“credible.” AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2020), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/asylum_in_the_united_states.p
df [https://perma.cc/QM9U-VGEJ]. 
 99.  See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RES. SERV., R45549, IMMIGRATION: U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 2 
(2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45539.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT2D-RGB2]. (describing the 
affirmative application as a voluntary application for asylum that is filed while the applicant is not in 
removal proceedings, defensive applications as occurring after removal proceedings have been initiated, 
and a credible fear application as occurring when an individual raises credible fears of harm in their home 
country only once stopped at the border). 
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and not in removal proceedings, voluntarily applies for asylum.100 In these cases, 
an Asylum Officer interviews the applicant; reviews the application; and either 
grants, denies, or refers the application to an IJ for further proceeding.101 If an 
application is denied and the applicant does not have a valid visa, the Asylum 
Officer will initiate removal proceedings and refer the case to an IJ for further 
proceedings (including a defensive application).102 
A defensive asylum application occurs when an applicant requests asylum 
after removal proceedings have been initiated against her, thus as a defense to 
deportation.103 Removal proceedings may occur after a failed affirmative 
application or after independent immigration enforcement.104 In reviewing 
defensive applications, the IJ takes the place of an Asylum Officer, holding a 
hearing to receive the applicant’s testimony and review any additional evidence, 
and ultimately deciding whether the applicant has carried her burden.105 The IJ’s 
ultimate decision may be written or oral, but an adverse finding must include the 
reasons for denial.106 
The third application—a credible fear application—occurs when individuals 
raise asylum claims after being stopped at the border. Individuals who meet 
certain statutory requirements may affirmatively apply for asylum at a port-of-
entry.107 But most applicants stopped at the border fail to meet these requirement 
and are placed in expedited removal proceedings.108 When these individuals raise 
their asylum claims, they technically make a defensive application.109 Instead of 
receiving the traditional defensive review though, these individuals are diverted 
to an interview with an Asylum Officer to determine “whether the [applicant] 
 
 100.  Id. at 3. 
 101.  Id. at 3–4. 
 102.  8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c). 
 103.  EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV. (EOIR), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2018 STATS. YB 24 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/8HUW-NA9F]. 
 104.  BRUNO, supra note 100, at 5.  
 105.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(e). 
 106.  Id. § 1240.11(c)(4); see also id. §1240.12. 
 107.  Id. § 208.2(a). 
 108.  CONCHITA CRUZ, AMIT JAIN, JOANNE LEE, ERIKA NYBORG-BURCH, SWAPNA REDDY, 
CLAIRE SIMONICH, DOROTHY TEGELER, & LIZ WILLIS, ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOC. PROJECT, 
VINDICATING THE RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AT THE BORDER AND BEYOND 8 (2018) [hereinafter 
ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOC. PROJECT] (citing INA §§ 235, 240 and Designating Aliens for Expedited 
Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,880 (Aug. 11, 2004)), https://asylumadvocacy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/ASAP-Expedited-Removal-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BMG-AN2M]; see 
also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (codifying the documentation requirements for the admissibility of immigrants 
and nonimmigrants). In 2017, Customs and Border Patrol apprehended 181,440 foreign nationals; and 
103,704 individuals were removed through expedited removal. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Annual Report: Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2017, at 12 tbl.6 (2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/enforcement_actions_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GB8K-U5EW]. 
 109.  See BRUNO, supra note 100, at 6 (explaining that when DHS determines an individual is 
inadmissible, that individual can rebut that by deciding to apply for asylum, which requires a showing of 
credible fear to “defend” against removal). 
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has a credible fear of returning to their home country.”110 This credible fear 
interview, often performed in an immigration detention center, tasks the 
applicant with convincing an Asylum Officer that there is a “significant 
possibility” that the applicant qualifies as a refugee.111 
If the applicant satisfies this burden, the application proceeds to Immigration 
Court as a defensive application.112 If the applicant cannot convince the Asylum 
Officer, she will be deported unless she requests review by an IJ.113 The IJ reviews 
the record from the interview and makes a de novo credible fear determination.114 
If the IJ finds a significant possibility that the applicant qualifies for asylum, the 
removal order is vacated and the case proceeds as a defensive application.115 If 
the IJ finds no significant possibility, DHS will deport the applicant.116 
2.  The Classic Model of Reviewing Asylum Applications 
Decisions by an IJ are usually appealable to either (or both) the federal courts 
or the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—another body within the 
Immigration Court. The availability of, and specific process for, appeals to these 
bodies has varied over time. For our purposes, it is worth first considering the 
classic model of asylum appeals that existed until the early twenty-first century. 
Except when an IJ rejects an applicant’s credible fear claim, applicants may 
appeal an IJ’s rejection of their asylum applications to the BIA.117 This quasi-
judicial body functions like an intermediate court of appeals.118 In the 1990s, the 
BIA consisted of twenty-three members, who reviewed IJ decisions in three-
member panels.119 Panels reviewed the IJ decision de novo and had the power to 
engage in new factfinding or to alter an IJ’s discretionary decision.120 The BIA 
reversed in approximately twenty-five percent of appeals.121 
 
 110.  ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOC. PROJECT, supra note 108, at 13. 
 111.  Id. at 13, 26–27 (describing the “significant possibility” standard and the interview process by 
which an individual would attempt to meet that standard); see also BRUNO, supra note 100, at 6 (same). 
 112.  Id. at 6 (noting that establishing credible fear leads to a referral for a full hearing in front of an 
immigration judge).  
 113.  8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g). 
 114.  Id. § 1208.30(g)(1) & (2)(ii). 
 115.  Id. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B). 
 116.  Id. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). 
 117.  Id. § 1003.1(b); see also id. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (“The immigration judge’s decision 
[concurring that no credible fear exists] is final and may not be appealed.”). 
 118.  See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS 
TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 9 (2003), available at https://www.ilw.com/articles/2003,1126-
dorsey.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3XA-L679] (“The BIA is a quasi-judicial body with exclusively appellate 
functions. It historically has served two purposes: deciding appeals of individual cases and issuing 
precedential decisions for guidance to the Service and the Immigration Judges.”). 
 119.  Id. at 20–21. 
 120.  Id. at 10 (quoting Charles Gordon et. al. Immigration Law and Procedure § 3.5[5](b) (2003)) 
(“[T]he Board may make a de novo review of the record and make its own conclusions and findings 
irrespective of those made by the Special Inquiry Officer.”). 
 121.  Comm. on Fed. Courts, Ass’n of B. of City of N.Y., The Surge of Immigration Appeals and Its 
Impact on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 60 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 243, 245 [hereinafter The 
Surge] (citing DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at app. 24). 
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Further, until the early 2000s, both the district and circuit courts exercised 
jurisdiction to review asylum decisions by the Immigration Court. First, the 
District Courts exercised jurisdiction over petitions on writ of habeas corpus from 
individuals challenging their deportation orders while in custody.122 
Second, the Circuit Courts exercise jurisdiction to review most final orders of 
removal, including those following rejection of an asylum application.123 Final 
removal orders are appealable to the circuit in which IJ making the decision 
resides.124 Most asylum decisions are rendered in either the Second or Ninth 
Circuits.125 
Historically, the Second Circuit included almost all immigration appeals in its 
Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP).126 CAMP seeks to expedite and clarify 
the appeal while encouraging resolutions with minimal participation by judges.127 
The program revolves around Staff Counsel, full-time attorneys within the court 
system.128 Staff Counsel conducts pre-argument conferences, attended by counsel 
for both parties (and sometimes the parties themselves), where the parties can 
state their view of the facts and issues.129 The goal of these conferences is to limit 
the issues on appeal or if possible negotiate a resolution before oral argument.130 
Staff Counsel also responds to the parties’ arguments, pointing out weakness and 
suggesting withdrawal when a case seems hopeless.131 
Under this system, as high as sixty-four percent of immigration appeals were 
disposed of after pre-argument conferences.132 And this success was bilateral: 
Cases were disposed because the applicants withdrew their appeal and because 
the government agreed to rehear a case in Immigration Court or to grant an 
application.133 
 
 122.  8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1995) (repealed 1996); Elizabeth Cronin, When the Deluge Hits and 
You Never Saw the Storm: Asylum Overload and the Second Circuit, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 549 (2007). 
 123.  Cronin, supra note 122, at 548. See also Erick Rivero, Note, Asylum and Oral Argument: The 
Judiciary in Immigration and the Second Circuit Non-Argument Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497, 
1499 (2006) (citing Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 
440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77, (1996)) (“While the AEDPA amended [INA] section 106 subject matter 
jurisdiction, abrogating judicial review of removal orders issued pursuant to a conviction for an 
aggravated felony, it did not affect judicial review of denied asylum applications.”). Orders of removal 
become final once the deadline for appeal to the BIA passes, or once the BIA affirms the order. Cronin, 
supra note 122, at 548. This includes petitions from a negative credible fear determination. See id. at 550 
(listing denials of asylum as one of the final orders over which circuit courts have jurisdiction). 
 124.  Id. at 548. 
 125.  See, e.g., EOIR, supra note 103, at 25 tbl.13 (showing the New York City heard 11,029 asylum 
claims—the most of any city—and that Los Angeles and San Francisco each heard approximately 4,000). 
 126.  Cronin, supra note 123, at 553. 
 127.  Irving R. Kaufman Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?—The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 
95 YALE L. J. 755, 756 (1986). 
 128.  Id. at 757 n.8. 
 129.  Id. at 757–58. 
 130.  Id. at 758. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Cronin, supra note 123, at 553. 
 133.  Id. 
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B.  The Asylum Appeal Surge 
In the 1990s, the United States made a number of changes regarding its 
approach to immigration, especially its enforcement of undocumented 
immigration.134 These changes drove an increase in removal proceedings and a 
corresponding increase in both asylum claims and asylum appeals.135 
By 1999, the BIA faced a docket backlog numbering in the tens of 
thousands.136 In response, the BIA Chairman instituted a pilot program that 
designated categories of cases as suitable for a streamlined procedure.137 These 
cases were reviewed by one permanent BIA member rather than the traditional 
three-member panel.138 If the IJ’s decision below met certain conditions, this one-
member panel could summarily affirm the decisions without any oral argument 
or opinion and dismiss the case.139 The chairman initially limited this Affirmance 
Without Opinion (AWO) system in the asylum context to decisions below 
rendered on procedural grounds or under specific settled precedent,140 or to 
appeals that were procedurally barred (for example, untimely appeals or appeals 
in cases that became moot).141 
The backlog continued to grow, however, and in early 2002—reeling from 
September 11th and staring down a backlog now 57,000 cases deep—Attorney 
General Ashcroft allowed the BIA to massively expand its pilot program.142 
These reforms included substantive and procedural changes intended to increase 
the rate at which the BIA affirmed IJs in three ways.143 
Most notably, the regulations removed de novo review of factual issues—
establishing a clear error standard for reviewing factual determinations—and 
stripped the BIA of its fact-finding powers.144 Further, the reforms expanded 
AWO cases, “mak[ing] single-member adjudication the default procedure.”145 A 
 
 134.  Newman, supra note 91, at 430. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People 
Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22–23 (2005). 
 137.  DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at 15–17. 
 138.  Id. at 17. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. app. 3 at 3–5 (allowing AWO in asylum claims regarding conviction of an aggravated felony 
“unless there is a substantial legal question” whether the applicant was convicted of such a felony). 
 141.  Id. app.3 at 5–6; see also Palmer et. al., supra note 136, at 24–25 (listing the initial categories of 
cases “appropriate for single-member affirmance without an opinion” and listing two categories the BIA 
Chairman added later). 
 142.  See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at 16–17, 19 (noting, for example, that the BIA 
Chairman in 2002 expanded the “certain categories of cases” that could be subject to AWO to “all 
cases”). See generally John D. Ashcroft & Kris W. Kobach, A More Perfect System: The 2002 Reforms of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals, 58 DUKE L.J. 1991 (2009). 
 143.  See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at 20 (listing the DOJ’s changes to the BIA 
appeal process, including changes to the standards of review, and the structure and composition of the 
BIA itself). 
 144.  Id. at 22. 
 145.  See Palmer et. al., supra note 136, at 28.  
06_MOLASKEY  (DO NOT DELETE) 9/15/2021  1:00 PM 
No. 3 2021] THEIR BROTHERS’ KEEPERS 99 
screening panel of employees within the BIA now assigns all appeals for single-
member adjudication unless the appeal meets one of six conditions signaling 
sufficient importance to go before a full panel.146 The single board member must 
affirm without opinion whenever the IJ’s decision is correct, errors are harmless 
or non-material, and the case raises no substantial issues and is “squarely 
controlled” by existing BIA precedent.147 Finally, the rules also impose hard time 
limits for ultimate decisions and briefing schedules and remove any oral 
argument from non-panel cases.148 
This streamlined procedure for BIA review substantially increased the rate 
of dispositions. In 1999, the BIA completed just over 23,000 cases.149 By 2004, the 
yearly disposition rate peaked at nearly 49,000 decisions.150 Further, most of these 
decisions were affirmances, especially AWOs.151 The rate at which the BIA 
granted relief to an appellant fell from twenty-five percent to just ten percent.152 
In the wake of the BIA’s increased affirmances of IJ decisions, immigration 
attorneys turned to the habeas petition to challenge Immigration Court decisions 
in the District Courts.153 Congress responded to this in 2005 by passing the REAL 
ID Act, which stripped the District Courts of any authority to review the 
Immigration Court’s determination that an asylum applicant lacked a credible 
fear of persecution.154 
This changing immigration procedure, BIA streamlining, and District Court 
jurisdiction stripping precipitated a “surge” of appeals to the circuit courts in the 
early 2000s, especially the Second Circuit.155 Most notably, both the number and 
rate of appeals from the BIA increased. The reasons for the rate increase are 
 
 146.  DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at 21. 
 147.  Id. at 23–24. 
 148.  Id. at 24–25. For good measure, the Attorney General also reduced the Board’s membership 
from twenty-three to eleven permanent members—fewer than sat just before Congress’ reforms in 1995. 
Id. at 24. The stated rationale was that the increase had not “appreciably reduced the backlogs” and had 
undermined “cohesiveness and collegiality.” Id. Some observers have noted however, that the first 
members cut were also the most likely to reverse an adverse IJ decision. John R.B. Palmer, The Nature 
and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of Appeal: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 13, 24 (2006). 
 149.  EOIR, 2003 STAT. YB S2 fig.27 (2004), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy03syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FHJ-
BR9Q]. 
 150.  EOIR, 2006 STAT. YB S2 fig.25 (2007), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy04syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9EQ-
BCAZ].  
 151.  AWOs also increased—from less than ten percent of all cases during the pilot program, to sixty 
percent by the end of 2002. The Surge, supra note 121. 
 152.  Id. (citing DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at app. 25).  
 153.  See Cronin, supra note 122, at 549. 
 154.  Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310 (2005) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(A)); see also Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1968–69 (holding that 
the Suspension Clause does not protect writs of habeas corpus that “permit a petitioner to claim that 
right to enter or remain in a country, or to obtain administrative review potentially leading to that 
result”).  
 155.  See, e.g., Newman, supra note 91; The Surge, supra note 121. 
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hotly debated.156 John Palmer, Stephen Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin set out 
to empirically test a number of potential reasons, including increased error, 
denied applicants with higher expulsion costs, and more non-detained aliens 
wishing to stay in the Country.157 The data could not exclude any of the proposed 
causes, but supported the theory that dissatisfaction with the BIA procedure, 
coupled with a spike in removal orders, compelled applicants and immigration 
lawyers to shift their focus to the Circuit Courts.158 
Regardless of the cause, by March 2004, applicants were appealing a quarter 
of all BIA decisions, up from less than five percent before the reforms.159 More 
than two-thirds of these appeals were brought in either the Second or Ninth 
Circuits.160 In three years, the number of agency cases before the Second 
Circuit—the overwhelming majority of which were BIA appeals—rose from 
under 700 per year to almost 5,300 (over fifty percent of its entire docket) in 
2005.161 
Faced with this deluge, the Second Circuit implemented a non-argument 
calendar system to screen all appeals from the BIA.162 Under this system, the Staff 
Attorney’s Office at the Second Circuit receives all briefs and records for BIA 
appeals.163 A law clerk in the office reviews these documents and prepares a 
memorandum and draft summary order recommending a specific disposition.164 
Each week, the office sends the completed summary orders (along with the 
supporting documents) to a panel of three judges who vote sequentially on the 
case.165 The judges vote on a sheet that provides five options: refer to the regular 
argument calendar, deny, grant, remand, or other.166 Additionally, the Second 
Circuit has removed all BIA appeals from CAMP participation.167 The non-
argument calendar is now the only system for adjudicating asylum appeals.168 
The non-argument calendar succeeded in decreasing the Second Circuit’s 
administrative backlog from 5,000 cases in 2005 to under 1,000 by 2015, where it 
 
 156.  For example, Judge Newman, posits that the shorter wait at the BIA has left applicants searching 
for a new way to extend their time in the United States. See Newman, supra note 91, at 431. The New 
York City Bar, however, concluded that increase came from a sense of aggrievement and concern that 
the BIA’s summary procedure increased the risk of error. See The Surge, supra note 121, at 245. 
 157.  See generally supra note 136, at 22–23.  
 158.  Id. at 94. 
 159.  Newman, supra note 91, at 431 (citing Palmer et. al., supra note 136, at 53 fig.5). 
 160.  Id. at 431 n.19.  
 161.  The Second Circuit had 696 administrative appeals pending on September 30, 2002. ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2003 ANN. REP. 
72 tbl.B-1 (2004). By September 30, 2005, the administrative appeals docket had increased to 5,299 cases. 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2005 
ANN. REP. 102 tbl.B-1 (2006). 
 162.  See Newman, supra note 91, at 432–34. 
 163.  Id. at 434. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Cronin, supra note 122, at 554. 
 168.  Id. 
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has remained since.169 The majority of cases on the non-argument calendar are 
disposed of by affirming the BIA in an unpublished decision.170 
C.  Appellate Procedural Justice in the Asylum Surge 
The story of the Surge provides insight into discrete and aggregate procedural 
justice in three important ways. The Surge shows: (1) how IACs implicate 
aggregate procedural justice by their decisions regarding appellate procedure, (2) 
how discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns may arise differently in 
facially similar cases, and (3) how programs like CAMP enable IACs to remedy 
aggregate concerns with targeted procedural changes rather than sweeping 
reforms. 
1.  Aggregate Procedural Justice and Asylum Appeals 
Whether the BIA or Second Circuit’s procedure for asylum appeals violate 
the Due Process Clause, the INA, or notions of discrete procedural justice are 
outside the scope of this Note.171 But the story of the Surge and judicial response 
shows how aggregate procedural justice concerns may arise in the appellate 
courts. 
At the threshold, asylum applications are the type of American adjudication 
likely to raise procedural justice concerns in the first instance. First, applications 
are made by individuals who the government seeks to remove from the United 
States. Given the potential consequences of removal proceedings, individuals in 
removal proceedings are analogous to criminal defendants,172 and thus uniquely 
affected by procedural justice concerns.173 Further, the initial proceedings are 
overseen within the agency tasked with removing the applicants. Asylum Officers 
are agents of the agency tasked with removing foreign nationals, and, even with 
the statutory independence provided to them,174 ALJs like the IJs likely raise 
more independence concerns than judges. Finally, many circuits, including the 
Second, have recognized that Immigration Court often fails to provide asylum 
applicants with adequate dignity or a reasoned decision.175 
 
 169.  The data discussed in this sentence derive from a review of the JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORTS for the years 2005-2018, tbls.B-1 available at 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts 
[https://perma.cc/M2YD-JXNX].  
 170.  Cronin, supra note 122, at 555. 
 171.  For an example of such arguments, see generally Eric Rivero, Note, Asylum and Oral Argument: 
The Judiciary in Immigration and the Second Circuit Non-Argument Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497 
(2006). 
 172.  For a discussion of the overlapping characteristics of the criminal law and civil removal 
proceedings, see generally Jennifer M. Cachón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the 
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Right, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010). 
 173.  See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 174.  See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). 
 175.  See, e.g., Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he elementary principles of 
administrative law, the rules of logic, and common sense seem to have eluded the Board in this as in other 
sentences.”); Seceida-Rosales v. I.N.S., 331 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the IJ “relied on a 
number of inappropriate standards . . . and erroneously resorted to speculation and conjecture”). 
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Additionally, the standard of review suggests that these cases raise aggregate 
procedural justice concerns. Most asylum appeals challenge an IJ’s adverse 
credibility finding.176 The Circuits review this credibility finding under the highly 
deferential substantial evidence standard: affirming the decision unless “the 
record demonstrates that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”177 This deferential standard drives a high affirmance 
rate. As such, these immigration cases—long-shot error cases, brought by 
members of a marginalized group who may feel aggrieved by the procedure 
below—raise serious aggregate procedural justice concerns. 
The BIA review process provides a case study in aggregate procedural 
concerns. As discussed, decreasing appellate procedure at the BIA led to an 
increase in the rate of appeals to the circuit courts.178 Something then, beyond 
just the number of dispositions, motivated applicants to appeal when statistically 
they otherwise would have accepted the BIA’s disposition. Palmer and others 
hypothesized that the BIA changes triggered “a fundamental shift in behavior 
among lawyers and [applicants], causing them to focus their litigation in the 
federal courts.”179 Further, the New York Bar Association’s Committee on 
Federal Courts argued that the decreased procedure left applicants “aggrieved” 
and feeling that they might be “deported without being accorded meaningful 
administrative review.”180 Finally, Palmer, in another paper, suggested that the 
BIA procedures may have driven applicants to push forward with appeals to the 
circuit courts “regardless of whether or not they [had] a realistic chance of 
success.”181 
Thus, the literature reveals, applicants were at least partially motivated by a 
feeling that the BIA changes left them without any real process to tell their story, 
and that they appealed to the circuits to vindicate their claims regardless of 
success. That is, they were motivated by aggregate procedural justice concerns. 
2.  The Differential Approach 
In light of the aggregate procedural justice concerns motivating the surge in 
appeals, the Second Circuit’s focus on accuracy and discrete concerns in crafting 
its procedural response may compound those problems. But this story also shows 
how those problems may not affect all asylum appeals the same way. The type of 
case known as asylum appeals can actually be thought of as seven types of cases 
through the aggregate procedural justice lens.182 
 
 176.  Newman, supra note 91, at 433 (“[M]ost asylum cases present a single issue—whether an adverse 
credibility finding by the BIA is supported by substantial evidence.”). 
 177.  See Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
581, 587–88 (2013). 
 178.  See supra notes 155–158 and accompanying text. 
 179.  Palmer et al., supra note 136, at 94. 
 180.  The Surge, supra note 121. 
 181.  Palmer, supra note 148, at 29. 
 182.  A case called an “asylum appeal” and automatically scheduled for non-argument may actually 
be: (1) an affirmative application with full BIA review, (2) an affirmative application and AWO, (3) a 
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First, a case will raise different procedural justice questions depending on 
whether it begins as an affirmative, defensive, or credible fear application. Thus, 
each type of case implicates different aggregate procedural justice concerns on 
appeal. Applicants may spend substantial time and effort constructing an 
affirmative application, and an affirmative application only reaches an IJ if an 
Asylum Officer first denies it. Thus, an affirmative applicant will have had two 
full opportunities for argument and decision making before reaching the circuit. 
Conversely, a defensive application is prepared while in custody and directly 
reviewed by the IJ. Moreover, an application in defense of removal proceedings 
has a strong odor of illegitimacy and thus may not receive as much respect as a 
completely voluntary application.183 In this sense then, appeals from defensive 
applications raise substantially more potential aggregate concerns than 
affirmative applications. Credible fear interviews present a more complex 
situation: they have some aspects of an affirmative application (like multiple 
reviews) and aspects of defensive applications (like the conditions and timing for 
preparation, and indicia of incredibility). 
Further, as discussed above, the BIA adds an additional wrinkle to the 
aggregate procedural justice analysis. First, an appeal from an adverse credible 
fear interview receives no BIA review and so comes to the circuit court on a path 
all its own. Further, appeals from the BIA might have received procedure rivaling 
the Learned Hand Model or might have received an AWO, with the AWO 
appeals raising far more aggregate concerns. 
3.  CAMP as a Targeted Remedy for Aggregate Concerns 
Finally, from this recognition that facially similar appeals may raise very 
different aggregate procedural justice concerns, the story of the Surge shows how 
courts may use targeted reforms to efficiently remedy aggregate procedural 
justice. CAMP provided valuable benefits in asylum appeals before the Surge, 
but docket increases made it impossible to maintain the program for all 
appeals.184 As just shown, however, reforms need not apply to every asylum 
appeal, at least not if it is only aimed at aggregate procedural justice concerns. 
The Second Circuit could partially reintegrate CAMP for those sub-types of 
asylum appeals raising the most aggregate procedural justice concerns to avoid 
being again crushed by the weight of every asylum appeal. 
Some might argue that this change would incentivize applicants to target a 
 
defensive application with full BIA review, (4) a defensive application and AWO, (5) a negative credible 
fear determination, (6) a positive credible fear determination-turned-defensive application with full BIA 
review, or (7) a positive credible fear determination-turned-defensive application and AWO. The 
paradigmatic case for all of these pose different potential aggregate procedural justice concerns.  
 183.  Many Americans share the view that foreign nationals are exploiting “asylum loopholes” to gain 
entry to United States. See Laurel Wamsley, Trump Calls for Asylum-Seekers to Pay Fees, Proposing 
New Restrictions, NPR (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/30/718627010/trump-calls-for-
asylum-seekers-to-pay-fees-proposing-new-restrictions [https://perma.cc/ZF52-TFS9]. Moreover, some 
have argued that foreign nationals may raise (or appeal) defensive asylum applications to delay removal. 
See Newman, supra note 91, at 431–32. 
 184.  Cronin, supra note 122, at 554–55. 
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specific method of application, but the substantive law constrains those perverse 
incentives. Aggregate procedural justice concerns are most weighty in the types 
of cases with the least likelihood of substantive success. Thus, since parties care 
most about outcomes, they would likely opt for application methods not subject 
to CAMP, if given the chance. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments presented in the Note are highly theoretical. Empirical 
research has barely begun to address appellate procedural justice in general, and 
without understanding what procedure individuals expect on appeal, we cannot 
know whether they expect more in light of a procedural failing experience below. 
But procedural justice theory has always preceded empirical study. 
Considering the impact of the position of the IACs within the greater legal system 
may help researchers better analyze data on procedural justice concerns in 
appellate procedure. Further, when IACs and scholars consider what level of 
procedure is due on appeal, considering the impact of the procedure below may 
open up unique reform alternatives that balance justice concerns and finite 
judicial resources. 
If the IACs do not consider the experiences that the parties bring to filling an 
appeal, their procedures may risk affirming not just the judgment of the trial 
court, but its treatment of the parties as well. 
 
